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Abstract: This chapter aims to direct attention to the political dimension of the social media age. 
Although current events like the Cambridge Analytica data breach managed to raise awareness for the 
issue, the systematically organized and orchestrated mechanisms at play still remain oblivious to most. 
Next to dangerous monopoly-tendencies among the powerful players on the market, reliance on 
automated algorithms in dealing with content seems to enable large-scale manipulation that is applied for 
economical and political purposes alike. The successful replacement of traditional parties by movements 
based on personality cults around marketable young faces like Emmanuel Macron or Austria’s Sebastian 
Kurz is strongly linked to products and services offered by an industry that simply provides likes and 
followers for cash. Inspired by Trump’s monopolization of the Twitter-channel, these new political 
acteurs use the potential of social media for effective message control, allowing them to avoid 
confrontations with professional journalists. In addition, an extremely active minority of organized 
agitators relies on the viral potential of the web to strongly influence and dictate public discourse – 
suggesting a shift from the Spiral of Silence to the dangerous illusion of a Nexus of Noise. 
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Stranger than fiction? 
The question of social media, secrets and targeted discreditation has featured in 
countless productions in the film industry, more so of late. For instance, Oliver Stone’s 
Snowden (Borman & Stone, 2016) draws its story from the real-life whistleblowing 
activites of Edward Snowden and sets out to highlight the drama and intrigues 
associated with the main character’s leaking of NSA surveillance procedures. In fact, as 
noted by Michelle Singeltary’s (2013) Washington Post article titled Edward Snowden – 
The Price of Being a ‘Whistleblower’, the real Snowden is on record for declaring ‘I 
can’t in good conscience allow the U.S. government, to destroy privacy, internet 
freedom and basic liberties for people around the world with this massive surveillance 
machine they are building’ from a Hong Kong hotel where he was hiding.  
Furthermore, conspiracy-laden films have always been steadily churned out by 
Hollywood executives, offering intriguing storylines that play on the paranoias of the 
media at the time. One must only recall the classic The Manchurian Candidate (Axelrod 
& Frankenheimer, 1962) starring Frank Sinatra in the role of a Korean War veteran who 
is brainwashed by the communists to engage in harmful activities against his own 
country, the United States. Years later, some producers must have felt that this 
controversial premise warranted an update as the film was remade (Demme, 2004) with 
Denzel Washington re-inventing the role as a Gulf War veteran instead. Interestingly, 
the communist threat was replaced by sinister Global corporations in the new version.  
It appears that computers and top-secret government programs are not really a new 
thing in film, as even a cursory glance reveals such genre efforts like WarGames 
(Schneider & Badham, 1983). The plot concerns a young hacker who breaks into the 
military computer system via a telephone modem to play a video game, unaware that 
the game is a program containing actual missile launch codes that could trigger nuclear 
war between the US and the Soviets. The film plays on the Cold War paranoias, coupled 
with computer glitches in the defense systems and identity theft.  
Moreover, Hackers (Peyser & Softly, 1995) made when the internet was still somewhat 
new and not so widespread, tried to take advantage of the cyberpunk culture that was 
considered hip among teens, and had its main characters using online handles such as 
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Acid Burn and Crash Override, as well as its villain using the internet alias The Plague. 
Indeed, the cyber culture was taken further with the futuristic Johnny Mnemonic 
(Carmody & Longo, 1995) which had a young Keanu Reeves playing a courier who 
delivers illegal or secret data directly downloaded into a microchip-implant in his brain. 
Furthermore, the iconic science-fiction thriller The Matrix (Silver & The Wachowski 
Brothers, 1999) also starred Keanu Reeves as a computer hacker who discovers he has a 
larger role as savior to mankind after he bands together with a group of techno-rebels.  
The internet took another sinister turn in The Net (Cowan & Winkler, 1995) with Sandra 
Bullock’s character in peril, facing identity theft. These films and similar themed 
productions demonstrated that society was on the brink of a major change in the way we 
dealt with banking, private emails, and the overall handling of our personal information. 
Although, it cannot be denied that the internet has changed our world and the way we 
interact and conduct business, it has also vastly impacted the film industry as well. 
Once, especially during the films of the 1990s, the internet was seen as a sinister threat 
that heroes and heroines had to combat to save the day, but now, the internet has 
evolved in such a great capacity, that the film industry itself has finally met its 
challenge. Indeed, the internet has affected how a film is now marketed. More films are 
released on streaming networks instead of cinema theatres, and in some cases, films are 
being made directly for the streaming services such as Netflix, Hulu and Amazon 
Prime.  
Facebook and social media platforms are also playing a central role in creating 
awareness for a new film. Thus, marketing for the film is fast evolving: the traditional 
methods of television trailers, home-video (VHS) and cinema previews have now been 
replaced by YouTube trailer uploads, Facebook pages, its multiple shares and sponsored 
advertising. As a matter of fact, in his article titled The Internet Totally Freaked Out 
Over The Star Wars Trailer for wired.com, Jordan Crucciola relayed that the trailer for 
Star Wars: The Force Awakens was able to reach over 1 million clicks and views in just 
23 minutes via this method on social media, thus proving that the power of social 
network could – together with its many commenters – not only reach large numbers in a 
short amount of time, but could too influence perceptions on what can be deemed good, 
bad or interesting.  
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Reality strikes 
In May 2017, the Austrian Green Party won a significant court case that forced 
Facebook to worldwide remove postings that fullfill the subject of ‘hate speech’ (APA, 
2017a). A similar claim has been expressed by former German Minister of Justice, 
Heiko Maas, who wanted to legally oblige the social media platform to scan their 
network for respective content and remove it. Facebook, however, strongly rejected the 
foreseen practice of self-censorship and sees the responsibility for regulating the issue 
on the side of the state and respective governmental measurements – preferably on a 
European level (Etzold, 2017). The announcement of Theresa May to set up a new 
national security unit dedicated to the preservation of truthful news content raises a 
whole lot of questions in the context of democracy and freedom of speech on its own 
(Walker, 2018). Nevertheless, the controversial social network had to face increased 
criticism since being accused to provide a platform for ‘fake news’ and hate postings 
during the US-election campaign in 2016 (Oates & Moe, 2016; Allcott & Gentzkow, 
2017), in a quick reaction suggesting the establishment of fact checking units for 
uploaded content on their own behalf back then. Former Austrian Chancelor Christian 
Kern – in his keynote speech at the European Newspaper Congress – openly urged 
Facebook to disclose the algorithms that are used to match users and targeted 
advertising and demanded the company to be subjected to common media law in order 
to balance the distorted means of competiton between social media content and 
professional communicators (APA, 2017b). It goes without saying that these algorithms 
are to remain the company’s best kept secret, since it can be considered the very core of 
their business model.  
As long as internal guidelines for the removal of explicit content are not bound to the 
limitations of the same regulations that media professionals have to consider for their 
work, they gain a clear advantage against institutionalized media outlets. Although 
former Chancelor Christian Kern criticized the role of institutionalized media in general 
in forming a ‘spiral of populism’ with attention-seeking political actors deliberately 
delivering the punchlines that sell copies,  media monopolys that enable the 
glorification of violence tend to be even more endangering for social and democratic co-
existence. Kern further pointed out the problematic condition of a newsmaking industry 
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that is primarly aiming at the generation of clicks, leaving journalistic decisions 
overruled by a fully quantified, algorithm-oriented perspective by stating that 
information is subsequently reduced to a product being purchased with data – equivalent 
to gold in the digital era (Karlsson & Clerwall, 2013).  
According to Hindman (2008) and Wilson (2008), the relationship between digital 
communication and democracy is a rather problematic one anyway. Several authors 
have looked into the role of internet and social media in the process of political 
participation and direct democracy (Aitamurto, 2012; Lim, 2012; Loader & Mercea 
2012; Margolis & Moreno-Riaño, 2013). Being one of the first to discuss the impact of 
technological developments and reshaped means of capitalization on democratic 
societies, Dean’s (2002) early critical account on the issue can be found echoing in a 
growing number of like-minded studies in the recent past. While Kang and McAllister 
(2011) had already focused on the capitalization of Google users, Marichal (2012) 
directly explored the issue of online exposure – and self-exposure – on social media 
channels as a factor for re-shaping concepts of democracy and public life.  Helbing et al. 
(2017) even suggested a major re-organization of society due to a techno-economical 
Pandora’s Box that has been opened by the inherent logics of Artificial Intelligence and 
Big Data. The case of a considerably large group of Macedonian teenagers from the 
sleepy village of Veles that launched a big number of websites filled with manipulated 
or made-up news content oriented towards Trump-supporters as an audience – cashing 
big money from ad revenues – is but one demonstration of the undesireable effects of 
such a constellation (Ladurner, 2016; Miller, 2016).  
Qualman (2010) already dealt with the impact of social media on modern life and 
business practices, attesting the biggest success rate to those applications that would 
allow users either  self-portrayal, competiton or a chance to take on a role as an 
esteemed opinion leader (2010, p. 117). Socio-economist Tilman Santarius further 
pointed out that consumer-friendly flatrates or cost-free streaming offers are generally 
purchased by rather expensive exchange of sensitive private data and demanded 
political measurements to avoid unrestricted profitization of personal information 
(Laufer, 2017). However, another serious and problematic aspect of the personalized 
web is the creation of effectively constructed filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011; Nguyen, Hui, 
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Harper, Terveen & Konstan, 2014; ) that exert a considerable effect on what and how 
the user might think about, in a way taking over the Framing and Agenda-Setting 
function of the mass media (Meraz, 2009; Sayre, Bode, Shah, Wilcox & Shah 2010).  
Therefore, next to a pre-existing human tendency for selective exposure to information 
according to personal beliefs and opinions (Aronson, 1969; Bandura, 2001), a pre-
selection of estimated fields of interests served on the base of algorithmic calculations 
further narrows the scope. A lack of exposure to diversity and conflicting opinions – in 
a normative sense provided by public broadcast media corporations – necessarily results 
in a vicious circle of self-affirming informational content that only adds to and tightens 
existing convictions. In the sense of a reversed Spiral of Silence-model (Noelle-
Neumann, 1978), the rise and public representation of Nationalist or extremist 
movements during the course of the last decade may partly be explained by a 
phenomenon that allows controversial anti-social agendas to be circulating in digital 
media channels around the world, hence adding a severe boost to the illusionary 
widespread acceptance of socially questionable thought and behavior (Yang, Kiang, Ku, 
Chiu, & Li, 2011; Dean, Bell, & Newman, 2012; O’Callaghan, Greene, Conway, Carthy 
& Cunningham, 2013; Patton, Eschmann & Butler, 2013; Awan, 2014; Farwell, 2014; 
Klausen, 2015).  
On the other side of things, the convenient benefits of automated algorithms seem to be 
convincing for the news professionals as well – which does not improve the accuracy 
and reliability of information published by established media corporations either. 
Associated Press is one of the pioneers when it comes to the introduction of machine 
learning processes to the newsroom. Since several years the news agency is leaving the 
authoring of short messages on issues such as sports, wheather or finance to computer-
based algorithms (Leitner, 2017). However, the Los Angeles Times’ ‘Quakebot’ 
reporting of an massive earthquake that never happened (Schmidt, 2017) should serve 
as but one demonstration of how misleading and potentially dangerous these 
automatically generated informations can turn out to be if they go unchecked by human 
reason. Yet another problem on the rise is the use of automated digital media campaigns 
performed by software robots – social bots – that imitate human behavior in networks or 
messenging systems, aiming at executing an influence on public opinion (Ehrenberg, 
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2012; Woolley, 2016; Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer & Flammini, 2016). Again, the 
US-election in 2016 has served to draw attention to this matter in the recent past  
(Kollanyi, Howard & Woolley), as well as did the Brexit referendum in the UK 
(Howard & Kollanyi, 2016). The role of social bots as actual political actors has been 
empirically investigated by Hegelich and Janetzko (2016) in a case study focused on 
Ukraine. Hegelich (2016, p.2) reported that 1,000 fake accounts can currently be bought 
for between $45 (simple Twitter accounts) and $150 (‘‘aged’’ Facebook-accounts), 
while (a) very high-quality piece of software that can be used to control 10,000 Twitter 
accounts costs around $500. 
Follow the leader...on Twitter 
While these developments might still be partly attributed to plain vanity or boost of 
popularity and market value, others are more specifically aiming at openly interfering 
with basic agreements and common practices in democratic social systems. Gu, 
Kropotov, Leopando and Estialbo (2017) presented alarming tendencies in terms of 
booming business industries trading with tools and services for explicit public opinion 
manipulation. Services offered on shady marketplaces –  identified to be mostly located 
in China, Russia and the Middle East – reach from simple content promotion – 
consisting in the generation of clicks, likes, comments, buying of followers etc.  –  to 
discreditation campaigns as well as manipulation of online votes and petitions. Gu et al. 
quantify the pricing for discrediting a journalist with rather cheap $55,000 (p. 59) while 
assisting to instigate a street protest sets one back for $200,000 (p. 60) and decisive 
course of action in the context of election campaigns is being manufactured for a budget 
of $400,000 (p. 61). However, all of the providers of these highly questionable services 
are operating in a combination of  illegal underground area, half-legit gray zone and 
legitimate distribution channels, as demonstrated by Gu et al. (2017, 10). At the top of 
the pyramid, an operator is orchestrating and distributing false information from out of 
the anonymous underground while the service providers simply disseminate the 
messages to basic consumers at the bottom of the pyramid that willingly amplify the 
propaganda to the masses. 
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Obviously, this development signifies a crucial threat to democracy by severely 
interfering with the decision-making process of voters, performed by automated 
assimilators that enter human interaction in the shape of Trojan horses. Next to taking 
over popular means of contemporary expression such as Twitter (Lokot & Diakopoulos, 
2016), Shirky (2011) and Michael (2017) even considered the bots to be responsible for 
hijacking the political debate alltogether. A tendency that could be observed in the 
course of the so-called European refugee crisis during the last few years, where 
mainstream media as well as politics were consistently urged to react on populist topics 
generated in social media networks (Holmes & Castaneda, 2016; Berry, Garcia-Blanco 
& Moore, 2016), with the latter seemingly taking over the Agenda-Setting function 
generally attributed to the former, as attested earlier (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2004). 
In this context it is important to consider that the very nature of these social media 
channels represents a simultaneous focalization of agenda-setting capacity in its 
institutional character as well as covering the furthermore attested Two-Step-Flow of 
information as a second crucial element in the process of opinion formation (Meraz, 
2009; Russell Neuman, Guggenheim, Mo Jang & Bae, 2014). 
However, the alternative would have been to leave deliberatly disseminated populist 
claims uncommented which would have been interpreted as yet another example of the 
‘Lügenpresse’, like the German nationalist movement Pegida termed it (Dostal, 2015). 
On the other hand, while contributions in social media networks are capable to generate 
a considerable momentum without a doubt, a rather essential step further in gaining 
significant public attention still seems to rely heavily on the issue being covered in 
mainstream media channels (Newman, 2009; Newman, 2011). While any other Trump-
tweet hits the headlines with certainty – in a perfect synergy catering to the interests of 
audience, publishers and Trump alike (Oates & Moe, 2016; Borah, 2017) – the possible 
impact of presidential blabla limited to an actual group of subscribed followers would 
unarguably be less strong.  
Nevertheless, considering the very nature of the medium, the content would very likely 
be shared by other users, who – despite their actual intention of criticizing or ridiculing 
the author – only contribute to creating attention for Trump as a political trademark, 
similar to news outlets that host extended features on the life story of the latest terrorist 
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attacker (Weimann & Winn, 1994; Nacos, 2016). While some countries’ journalism 
outlets roughly agree on a reporting style that would focus more on the victims than the 
attacker in an effort to not grant the latter have his – potentially desired and sought after 
– fifteen minutes of fame and attention, a single post in a social media channel leaking 
the identity of the propretrator is enough to start a wave of articles featuring interviews 
with relatives, schoolmates and teachers. Therefore, what might work as a convenient 
source of content to fit into the latest issue of a publication or broadcast might have the 
potential to generate and exert a considerable amount of pressure, dictating the topics 
that journalists somehow find themselves to be forced to deal with (Jewitt, 2009; 
Beckett, 2016).  
The rise of Twitter-excessive Trump in 2016 can be seen as a model for French ex-
banker Macron’s and Austrian high school graduate/university drop-out Sebastian Kurz’ 
successful self-stylization as messiah-like leaders of movements bearing more 
resemblance to social media hyped, self-promoted personality cults than to actual 
political players with openly recognizable political programs (Aberer, 2011; Piontek, 
2012; Beck, 2013; Eberl, Zeglovits & Sickinger, 2017). Sharing similar slogans bare of 
any content – such as Zeit für Neues (time for something new) or Penser printemps 
(think spring) – during their election campaign (Zeit für Neues, 2017; Penser printemps, 
2017), both politicians offered a vast space for voters to project their specific hopes and 
expectations. Macron demonstrated his personal commitment to manifest his signature 
call to rejuvination by boasting a bill of €26,000 for make-up artists as soon as three 
months after his election (APA, 2017c). A wise investment, considering that the 
youthfullness of politicians like Macron or Kurz is one of their main assets. However, 
while Howard, Bradshaw, Kollanyi and Bolsolver (2017) have been demonstrating that 
so-called junk news were less present on Twitter as compared to its US counterpart, 
they recognized a considerable increase of such content for the second round that they 
credit to the use of social media bots. However, content on Macron still tends to 
dominate the traffic on Twitter between the two rounds (Howard et al., 2017, p. 5). One 
thing the two elections do share is that in both countries political parties have been 
attacked by hackers, leaking sensitive data to the media and the public (Fidler, 2016; 
Wirth, 2016; Reynolds, 2017) which demonstrates that the war games have just begun. 
A similarly martial approach to spin-doctoring has been demonstrated by former 
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Israelian Army Officer and globally active political campaigner Tal Silberstein, who 
orchestrated the performance of Austria’s Social Democratic Party from out of his ‘war 
room’ termed office. Ending in a desastrous scandal that followed his arrestation in Tel 
Aviv on August 14, 2017 – due to charges of money laundry, among others –, 
Silberstein became the personification of ‘dirty campaigning’ techniques used during 
the election campaign, among them false flag Facebook accounts aiming at the 
discreditation of political opponents. Needless to say that individuals attached to the 
party/movement/personality cult of election-winning Sebastian Kurz have later on 
found to be responsible for vice-versa activities on the web by producing content aiming 
at insulting then chancelor Christian Kern. However, it gets obvious that democratic 
decision making is more and more vulnerable to calculated misinformation and targeted 
discreditation enabled by the technological possibilities and seemingly anonymous 
space provided by the internet. 
From Spiral of Silence to Nexus of Noise 
The latest – and maybe most revealing – example of the populist, social media-oriented 
modus operandi of Austria’s new government has been provided by Karoline Edtstadler, 
Secretary of State at the Federal Ministry of the Interior and member of Kurz’ 
movement/party/personality cult. In perfect coherence to Colin Crouch (2004) and his 
definition of the post-democratic condition, she justified a controversially discussed law 
reform regarding sexual delinquents as corresponding to a perceived notion of natural 
justice that she declared to deduce directly from respective postings on Facebook and 
Twitter in the course of an interview on February 5, 2018 (Mayer, 2018).  
It seems that the deduction is free from consideration of the unarguably limited ability 
for any of the strongly emotional content generated on these social media channels to 
produce balanced and objective views and arguments – next to presenting distorted 
representations of a perceived public opinion generated by algorithms – as well as 
acknowledgment of considerable criticism of opposing law experts. Similar to the 
somehow misleading idea of direct democracy in form of a referendum or vote, the 
conception of Edtstadler – stressing her obligation to push the agendas of anonymously 
acting shot callers on selected communication platforms as a primary guideline for her 
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political mandate – unmistakenly demonstrates the post-democratic, populist conception 
of the politician as a faithful servant to the dictate of an intentionally perceived – or 
even self-adjusted – majority. Borrowing from the Crusaders, the convenient 
justification Facebook lo vult – Mob willing – comes into mind. Interestingly enough, 
only a few days later, the opportunist character of Kurz and his right-wing coalition 
partner was further underlined by the demonstrated determination to simply ignore a 
petition signed by more than 500.000 citizens that opted for a continuation of a general 
smoking ban and their determination to push things through on a parliamentary level 
before a referendum on the issue could be scheduled (Richter, 2018).  
Either the displayed perception of Edstadler is simply revealing her illiteracy in terms of 
competence to decode our contemporary media surrounding or a cold-blooded 
instrumentalization of the random and distorting momentum that large parts of online 
communication patterns can be attributed with. While the latter seems to be common 
practice among political actors around the world, as demonstrated earlier, Edtstadler 
provides evidence to assume the previous possibility by her statement. Positioning 
postings on social media channels as directly analogues with the perception of the 
population serves to present Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence (Noelle-Neumann, 
1978) with a reversed juxtapose of a presumed Nexus of Noise. This perspective is 
supported by a recent study of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD, 2017) that 
demonstrates that a loud minority actively orchestrated social media campaigns against 
refugees during the elections in Germany. The research revealed that half of the likes 
signalizing support for hate-comments can be traced back to only five percent of the 
user accounts on the selected platforms. On top of it, the extremely active core of this 
minority – twenty-five percent of these likes seem to be generated by only one percent 
of the user profiles – deliberately aim at manipulating social media algorithms to 
magnify its impact. Coordinated activity along agreed upon timelines or the use of 
Hashtags are employed to boost the ranking of these contributions and therefore 
wrongly suggest their relevance to a broader part of the public. A ‘‘monumental 
deception’’ in the words of analyst Philip Kreißl (DPA, 2018), that is mainly generated 
by supporters of right-wing movements, as the study further reveals. Muslims and 
refugees list as the prime targets of these attacks in Austria, according to a report of the 
counter-initiative #GegenHassimNetz (eho, 2018). 
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Therefore, Edtstadler’s statement is drastically demonstrating the urgent need for 
educational measurements that help to build a wide scale media literacy, hopefully 
providing for the progression of the mistakenly presumed or self-declared digital natives 
into a critical mass of digitally civilized entities. Equipped with a basic core competence 
for realistically evaluating and critically questioning the actual relevance of our digital 
surrounding, we would less likely fall into the trap of interpreting psychologically 
triggered digital counterparts of the Tourette syndrom as significant events. However, 
the rather disturbing example of Edtstadler shows that many of us are still at the stage of 
running for their lives in order to escape the approaching train – if we draw a parallel to 
the dawning of the Cinematic Age.  
Big Data, Micro-targeting and Social Manipuledia 
Unfortunately, such much needed discourse is buried under loads of Social Media 
Management and E-Marketing courses in the curriculum of Communication Faculties. 
Especially, considering the urgent need for a distant look and critical reflection of where 
the implementation of a never-ending flood of mediated distractions in our daily life has 
led us in regard to our condition as democratic citizens, political actors and 
conscientious human beings in full command of their critical capacities – and where we 
aim to draw the line between convenience and reason. However, with the dramatically 
changing  demographic composition of Zuckerberg’s social media giant, that – in its 
fourteenth year – suffers from a massive loss of young blood and strongly gains users 
from over fifty-five years of age instead (Sweney, 2018), one is curious to see the 
nature, impact and degree of centralization of the alternative media channels that the 
economically more significant group of users is migrating to and its consequences for 
democratic developments.  
Latest disclosures by Christopher Wylie in the wave of the Cambridge Analytica 
scandal put even more public and political pressure on the tumbling giant. Under the 
umbrella of Cambridge Analytica, notorious for their involvement in the Brexit-
campaign 2016 (Cadwalladr, 2017), Aleksandr Kogan, Professor of Psychology at 
Cambridge University, had created a Facebook-App named ‘Thisismydigitallife’ for his 
enterprise Global Science Research that had more than 270.000 downloaders doing a 
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personality test (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018). However, by accepting the 
Terms of Trade, they also agreed to the use of their data for ‘scientific purposes’ as well 
as authorization of scanning the profiles of their added friends on base of the critically 
discussed ‘Third Party Consent’. The final heist consisted of personal data of about 
ninety million Facebook accounts and got analyzed by a program the whistleblower 
Wylie had developed. As Wylie put it: ‘We exploited Facebook to harvest millions of 
people’s profiles. And built models to exploit what we knew about them and target their 
inner demons’ (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018, para 3). The results had been 
sold to strategically support the presidential campaign of Donald Trump. SCL Group, 
the mother company of Cambridge Analytics, had Breitbart-mastermind and Trump-
stablemate Steve Bannon as a board member from 2014 to 2016 and on top of it 
received $15 million by Trump-financer Robert Mercer (Cadwalladr, 2018). Only a few 
days after Wylie went public, a Channel 4 video surfaced (Revealed: Trump’s election 
consultants filmed saying they use bribes and sex workers to entrap politicians, 2018) that 
has Cambridge Analytica-boss Alexander Nix boasting to potential clients in the course 
of an undercover report. He claimed that the data analysis provided by the organization 
had helped to critically influence more than two hundred elections all over the word – 
from India, to the Czech Republic and Argentinia to Nigeria. He further claimed 
responsibility for the election of Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta – a campaign that 
was characterized by deliberate desinformation that targeted political opponents. Next 
to Nix being suspended from his position, British authorities, in a first reaction, issued 
orders to search the organization’s headquarters in London (Elgot, 2018). At the same 
time, the British Parliament, as well as the European Parliament and the US Senate, 
have issued requests for Zuckerberg to justify himself in front of their institutions 
(Reuters, 2018). Furthermore, investors filed lawsuits against Facebook, making the 
company lose about $60 billion of market value within two days. With Zuckerberg 
dressed up in suit and tie, humbly admitting his mistake in front of teethless US-
interrogators, some had hoped it would be up to the European Parliament to put him on 
the hot seat. These expectations were grounded on consistent hints towards 
governmental strategies to impose stronger regulations on Facebook in Europe – as 
suggested by EU-commissioner Margarethe Vestager since quite a while (Rice, 2018).  
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After repeatedly addressed invitations of President Antonio Tajani (APA, 2018), the 
hearing was streamed live on the internet – upon strong urge of Commission and 
Parliament members. Although important questions regarding missing competitors, 
unpaid taxes, or the ten thousand fact checkers he promised to install in 2016 happened 
to be incorporated in the lenghty talks of  his interrogators, Zuckerberg simply ignored 
uncomfortable issues when it was his turn to respond (Salinas, 2018). One of these 
matters regarded the notorious shadow profiles – accounts of individuals not registered 
on Facebook that are generated by illegal screening of data stemming from internet use 
or access to mobile phones and monetized by being sold on the market (Blue, 2013; 
Garcia, 2017). Suddenly in a hurry to catch his – private – jet plane back to Los 
Angeles, Zuckerberg half-heartedly agreed to provide missing answers in written form 
and disappeared.  
Despite all due criticism, Facebook is but the tip of the iceberg of a more general 
problem – since Zuckerberg’s money machine is only the most visible of all the actors 
accumulating data on the web, next to insurance companies, banks, employers, schools 
or the obvious intelligence services. Therefore, it would be too easy to urge private 
companies to act responsible while leaving the heart of the matter untouched. On the 
other hand, turning these regulative issues into a governmental concern is not free from 
danger either – as demonstrated by China, where the slight nuisance of bought followers 
and likes is being replaced with the blank horror of a social credit (Hatton, 2015). 
However, the latest case of Amazon selling its face-scan software Rekognition to the 
US-police – criticized as ‘‘a recipe for authoritarianism and disaster’’ by Malkiya Cyril 
of the Black Lives Matter Movement (Wong, 2018) – demonstrates that the 
technological means for full-scale surveillance of citizens are available elsewhere as 
well. In the meanwhile, despite the boastful talk of Nix in the leaked video, Cambridge 
Analytica as well as SCL closed down in May 2018, arguing to not be able to generate 
new clients anymore due to their ruined reputation. Nevertheless, a newly founded 
company named Emerdata lists Nix as a director – next to former SCL executives and 
the daughters of billionaire Robert Mercer (Solon & Laughland, 2018). 
No matter who will be the operator of the next fashionable social networks – Vero 
started an attempt earlier this year, offering the absence of advertising and algorithms –, 
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as long as he is in control of the content the noble normative ideals of direct democracy 
will be hard to obtain. The same is true for Italy’s MoVimento 5 Stelle (5 Star 
movement, the capitalized V stands for vaffanculo, Italian for ‘kiss my ass’), another 
highly populist vehicle successfully employing the Troyan horse of direct participation. 
While nomination of candidates and even the content of the movement’s political 
program are seemingly based on crowdsourcing and swarm intelligence compiled on the 
party’s website, a closer look at the ownership structure of the homepage reveals that it 
is tied to Casaleggio Associati, a consulting company for internet strategies, belonging 
to the son of the ex-comedian and movement’s founder Beppo Grillo (Siefert, 2018). 
Again, control over content, no matter if it appears on a seemingly public website or a 
social network, is hardly ever compatible with direct democracy. But it is the perfect 
condition for effective message control – which is also being employed by Kurz and his 
movement that already saw several cases in which critical statements of their own 
Ministers have been deleted from the Ministry’s website (Oswald, 2018a; 2018b). It 
should not be overlooked that such a strict attempt of message control can easily give 
way to mind control – with an intimidated fellowship anticipating the course of action in 
advance and fully abstaining from healthy mechanisms of constructive criticism. 
Conclusion 
As clearly demonstrated, one needs to be careful about actions that are originating on 
social media platforms and are taking the lead in the formation of opinions that in turn are 
justifying the directives of political players. It is becoming commonplace to see political 
players making decisions based on responses posted on social media platforms, but again, 
the danger lurks in the way that these responses are but a limited mirror only and do not 
exactly represent the majority of citizens. The risk of the message being unclear is great, 
and the argument stands whether the social media platforms are correct in the form an 
argument is presented and how actions based on these postings may not be the right steps 
to take. However, these developments ask for a reconsideration of the value given to the 
aspect of media literacy in the context of school curriculums. Pushing for the 
implementation of technology in class in order to prepare a next generation of skilled 
operators that are well-versed in employing its full range of possibilities for professional 
purposes might be a promising perspective for the neo-liberal/authoritarian governments 
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that are dominating the political discourse in Europe at this time. However, the 
preparation for a responsible, reflective and critical attitude towards the incorporation of 
this technology and its unfiltered outburst of manipulative disinformation does not list on 
this agenda for good reasons. Hence, the need for the establishment of educational 
structures that are capable of providing citizens with a sufficient amount of media literacy 
can be considered as an essential requirement for the survival – or re-establishing – of 
democracy in times of Fakebook and Netfix. 
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